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OIL AND TAXES:  
REFOCUSING THE TAX POLICY QUESTION IN THE 
AFTERMATH OF THE BP OIL SPILL 
Temi Kolarova
* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In April 2010, an explosion occurred on the Deepwater Horizon 
oil rig in the Gulf of Mexico.
1
  The accident resulted in oil leaking in-
to the ocean for eighty-seven days, at which point BP p.l.c. (BP), the 
company which owned the well, installed a cap to contain the flow of 
oil.
2
  Although the full extent of the oil spill damage may take years to 
assess, President Obama called the accident “the worst environmental 
disaster America has ever faced.”
3
  Shortly after the catastrophe, BP 
assessed the cost of the clean-up efforts, damages, and claims pay-
ments to businesses hurt by the oil spill to be $32 billion, but warned 
that the actual cost could easily exceed this number.
4
  In light of the 
impending elections, both political parties saw the accident as an op-
portunity to direct public discontent to “local issues and larger ideol-
ogies.”
5
  As a result, politicians and the media devoted much of their 
attention to BP’s tax treatment and, more generally, the tax treat-
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leigh Dickinson University.  I am grateful to Professor Michael Simkovic and Profes-
sor Charles Sullivan for their guidance and to Eric Latzer for his comments and assis-
tance.  I would like to thank my husband, Anton, for his unwavering support and 
patience. 
 1 Campbell Robertson, Search Continues After Oil Rig Blast, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 
2010, at A13. 
 2 Suzanne Goldenberg, BP Stops Oil Leak in Gulf of Mexico for First Time Since April, 
GUARDIAN (London), July 16, 2010, at 1. 
 3 President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President to the Nation on the BP 
Oil Spill (June 15, 2010) [hereinafter President’s Remarks], available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-nation-bp-oil-spill. 
 4 Neil King Jr., BP Seeks Tax Cut on Cleanup Costs, WALL ST. J., July 28, 2010, at A8.  
Indeed, BP revised the cost estimate upward to $40.9 billion in its annual report for 
the fiscal year 2011.  BP, p.l.c., Annual Report, (Form 20-F) 34 (Mar. 3, 2011) [he-
reinafter Form 20-F].   
 5 Damien Cave, In Campaigns, that Gulf Spill Covers Nation, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 
2010, at A1.  
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ment of the oil industry.
6
  BP’s financial statements for the second 
quarter of 2010 indicated that BP took a tax deduction for the $32 
billion in expected remedial spill costs.
7
  Thus, BP’s tax liabilities 
could have decreased by as much as $10 billion.
8
  For some, the pos-
sibility of a reduced tax burden for BP in the aftermath of such an 
environmental disaster meant that oil companies were not paying 
their “fair share of taxes.”
9
  Although this particular criticism was mis-
guided, it reinvigorated a more fundamental debate—whether the oil 
industry merits favorable tax treatment.
10
 
This Comment explores the preferential treatment of the oil in-
dustry under the current Internal Revenue Code (the “Code”).  Oil 
companies have enjoyed tax incentives since the beginning of the 
twentieth century.
11
  According to some government estimates, the 
industry saves $4 billion in taxes per year.
12
  Past attempts to repeal oil 
tax incentives have failed.
13
  The BP oil spill, however, reignited the 
debate over the tax treatment of oil companies and presented a new 
opportunity for legislative action.  This Comment argues that the pre-
ferential tax treatment for oil companies lacks adequate justification 
and is contrary to important policy goals.  Furthermore, repealing 
these tax provisions may not be sufficient.  Decades of excessive oil 
consumption have created security, environmental, and economic 
vulnerabilities that need to be addressed through specially-tailored 
measures, which should complement the repeal of oil tax incentives. 
Part II of this Comment provides background information about 
the BP oil spill and the tax questions that emerged after the accident.  
Part III then lists and analyzes the numerous provisions in the current 
 
 6 See, e.g., David Kocieniewski, As Oil Industry Fights a Tax, It Reaps Subsidies, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 3, 2010, at A1. 
 7 BP, p.l.c., Report of Foreign Private Issuer, (Form 6-K) 16 (Jul. 27, 2010) [he-
reinafter Form 6-K].  BP’s estimate of the oil spill costs was later increased to $ 40.9 
billion. See supra note 4.  Thus, BP’s tax liability could decrease even more than in-
itially estimated. 
 8 Form 6-K, supra note 7, at 16 n.(a). 
 9 156 CONG. REC. S4,912  (daily ed. June 15, 2010) (statement of Sen. Bernard 
Sanders). 
 10 See, e.g., 156 CONG. REC. E1,252  (daily ed. June 30, 2010) (statement of Rep. 
Earl Blumenauer) (arguing that oil companies do not need tax subsidies and that 
such subsidies are harmful to the future of the American economy).  
 11 Mona Hymel, The United States’ Experience with Energy-Based Tax Incentives: The 
Evidence Supporting Tax Incentives for Renewable Energy, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 43, 47 
(2006). 
 12 Kocieniewski, supra note 6. 
 13 SALVATORE LAZZARI, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL3357, ENERGY TAX POLICY: 
HISTORY AND CURRENT ISSUES 6 (2008).   
KOLAROVA_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/15/2012  6:28 PM 
2012] COMMENT 353 
Code that afford preferential treatment to the oil industry.  In Part 
IV, the Author explains why these subsidies have no justification to-
day and gives some additional reasons for their repeal.  Part IV also 
evaluates the current legislative actions designed to curb oil tax in-
centives.  Part V indentifies some issues that repeal alone may not be 
able to address and proposes a possible solution. 
II. BACKGROUND: THE BP OIL SPILL AND THE TAX CONTROVERSY 
BP is an international oil and gas company operating in more 
than eighty countries.
14
  In 2009, it ranked as the fourth largest com-
pany in the world by total sales (over $361 billion).
15
  On April 22, 
2010, a rig leased by BP off the Gulf Coast sank,
16
 and oil leaked into 
the Gulf for almost three months.
17
  The public was outraged.  One 
survey indicated that eighty-one percent of respondents disapproved 
of BP’s response to the spill and that sixty-four percent supported 
criminal charges against the company.
18
  Public criticism had a spil-
lover effect on the industry as a whole.
19
 
On July 27, 2010, BP released the company’s quarterly financial 
statements and announced that it was taking a deduction for the es-
timated oil spill costs.
20
  These costs included the clean-up expenses 
and the $20 billion fund that BP established to settle the claims re-
lated to the spill.
21
  The public received the news with disapproval.  
Robert Gibbs, the White House Press Secretary at that time, cautious-
ly expressed his doubt that the public would approve of BP taking the 
deduction.
22
  But others outright described BP’s deduction as shifting 
 
 14 BP Plc., N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/business/companies 
/bp_plc/index.html (last updated May. 4, 2011). 
 15 The Global 2000, FORBES (Apr. 8, 2009, 6:00 PM), http://www.forbes.com/lists/ 
2009/18/global-09_The-Global-2000_Rank.html. 
 16 Russell Gold et al., Missing Workers Feared Dead as Gulf Rig Sinks, WALL ST. J., 
Apr. 23, 2010, at A5. 
 17 See Goldenberg, supra note 2.  
 18 Gary Langer, Poll: BP Oil Spill Response Rated Worse than Katrina, ABCNEWS (June 
7, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/PollingUnit/Media/poll-bp-oil-spill-rated-worse-
katrina-criminal-charges/story?id=10846473.  
 19 During a congressional hearing on the oil spill, the oil industry was castigated 
for its lack of adequate accident response plans.  See Liam Denning, Backlash Against 
Oil Could Backfire, WALL ST. J., June 1, 2010, at C8. 
 20 See Form 6-K, supra note 7, at 16 n.(a). 
 21 Id. at 27. 
 22 See Jia Lynn Yang, BP to Cut Its U.S. Tax Bill by $10 Billion, WASH. POST (July 27, 
2010, 11:56 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article 
/2010/07/27/AR2010072704437.html. 
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oil spill liabilities “to the back of the American taxpayers.”
23
  Although 
the sum is larger than usual, BP relied on standard accounting prac-
tices to claim the deduction.
24
 
As a British corporation, BP is subject to U.S. income tax on the 
income derived from the corporation’s U.S. operations.
25
  Under the 
U.S. corporate tax system, taxable income is calculated by subtracting 
qualified business expenses and other deductions from total business 
income.
26
  Tax liability is calculated by multiplying the taxable income 
by the applicable corporate income tax rate, less any tax credits that 
the business may be able to claim.
27
  Section 162(a) of the Code pro-
vides for the deduction of trade or business expenses.
28
  In relevant 
part, the section states that “all the ordinary and necessary expenses 
paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying of any trade or 
business” are deductible.
29
  Among others, “ordinary and necessary” 
include “insurance premiums against fire, storm, theft, accident, or 
other similar losses in the case of a business.”
30
  The deduction is al-
lowed even if it exceeds the gross income of the applicable period.
31
 
In a report on BP’s expense deductibility, the Congressional Re-
search Service explained that, if an oil spill results directly from a 
company’s operations, the clean-up and claim settlement costs must 
be treated as “ordinary and necessary” business expenses.
32
  Other tax 
professionals agreed that BP was authorized to deduct the $32 billion 
costs that the company incurred in relation to the oil spill.
33
  The 
main rationale behind the deduction under §162 is a simple one—
income is to be taxed, not revenue.
34
  The deduction properly reflects 
 
 23 Patrik Jonsson, If BP Qualifies for $10 Billion Cleanup Tax Break, Should It Get 
One?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Aug. 6, 2010), http://www.csmonitor.com/ 
USA/Politics/2010/0806/If-BP-qualifies-for-10-billion-cleanup-tax-break-should-it-
get-one. 
 24 King, supra note 4. 
 25 MOLLY SHERLOCK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41365, TAX DEDUCTIBLE EXPENSES: 
THE BP CASE 3 (2010). 
 26 Id. at 1. 
 27 Id.  
 28 26 U.S.C. § 162(a) (2006). 
 29 Id. 
 30 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-1(a) (as amended in 1993). 
 31 Id.  
 32 SHERLOCK, supra note 25, at 3. 
 33 See King, supra note 4. 
 34 Income is a measure of taxpayer’s enrichment and enrichment is considered 
to be the best indicator of a taxpayer’s ability to pay taxes.  See MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN, 
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 104 (11th ed. 2009).   
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the cost of earning the income.
35
  In other words, refusing BP the de-
duction would be contrary to one of the fundamental principles of 
the U.S. income tax system. 
The fact that the deduction could allow BP to take a refund for 
taxes paid in previous years raised public concerns.
36
  This too has a 
reasonable explanation under the Code.  When a corporation’s busi-
ness deductions exceed its income, the corporation has a net operat-
ing loss (NOL).
37
  The Code permits a corporation to spread such 
losses over a period of time
38
 to protect businesses with fluctuating in-
come from the negative effects of an accounting system that calcu-
lates taxes on a yearly basis.
39
  Thus, the taxpayer can ease the income 
and liability changes during different business cycles and reduce fi-
nancial risk.
40
  In effect, the government works with the taxpayer in 
sharing both the benefits and losses of revenue.
41
  When NOL is car-
ried back, the taxpayer can receive a refund for taxes paid during 
previous years; when NOL is carried forward, it reduces future tax 
burdens.
42
  Currently, a taxpayer can carry back losses for up to the 
two preceding years and forward for up to twenty years.
43
 
When initially reported, BP’s tax savings were estimated as of the 
time when the firm’s second-quarter financial statements were filed, 
which did not allow a conclusive determination as to whether BP 
would actually be able to realize NOL benefits.
44
  Later, BP reported 
that it recorded a net loss of $4.8 billion for the fiscal year 2010 and 
confirmed that it would pay no U.S. income tax based on this overall 
loss for the year.
45
  In addition, the net loss could result in additional 
tax savings
46
 in the form of NOL. 
 
 35 Id. at 1. 
 36 See SHERLOCK, supra note 25, at 6 (noting suggestions that BP should not take 
the deduction). 
 37 See 26 U.S.C. § 172(c) (2006).  
 38 See § 172(b).  
 39 Daniel L. Simmons, Net Operating Losses and Section 382: Searching for a Limita-
tion on Loss Carryovers, 63 TUL. L. REV. 1045, 1051 (1989). 
 40 SHERLOCK, supra note 25, at 4. 
 41 Id. at 4–5. 
 42 Id. at 4. 
 43 § 172(b). 
 44 See SHERLOCK, supra note 25, at 6. 
 45 Jodson Berger, BP Cut Tax Bill by $ 13B Due to Losses from Spill, FOX NEWS (Apr. 
22, 2011), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/04/22/bp-cut-tax-13b-losses-
spill/. 
 46 See id.  While BP reported part of this information, it must be noted that any 
conclusions about the taxes actually paid by BP for a given tax year are not complete-
ly accurate when based solely on the information from the company’s annual report.  
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The fact that BP’s actions were legitimate under tax law prin-
ciples did not prevent public ire.  Senator Bill Nelson called for a 
congressional inquiry into the deductibility of the settlement fund 
and the anticipated legal costs that BP could incur defending spill-
related lawsuits.
47
  Three days after BP’s deduction announcement, 
Representative Raul Grijaval introduced the Closing Oil Spill Tax 
Loopholes Act of 2010.
48
  The bill proposes that taxpayers cannot 
claim deductions for certain damages paid in relation to oil spills.
49
  
In a similar effort, Representative Eliot Engel introduced the Denial 
of Certain Tax Benefits to Offending Oil Polluters Act of 2010.
50
  The 
bill denies certain tax benefits to oil companies involved in oil dis-
charge incidents.
51
  As of publication, the House has not considered 
either bill.  Nothing about the BP expense deduction conflicts with 
the fundamental principles of the U.S. income tax system.  Yet, a lot 
of political energy was spent on preventing BP from claiming the de-
duction most likely because of a desire to please the unhappy oil-spill-
sensitive voters.  Media outlets reported that taxpayers viewed the de-
duction as wrongful and inappropriate.
52
  While the emotionally 
charged criticism of the deduction is not well-founded in general tax 
principles, the debate about tax fairness for oil companies should be 
refocused on far more significant issue—the tax treatment of the oil 
industry as a whole.
53
  The BP oil spill tax controversy highlights the 
fact that, from a tax policy perspective, it is misguided to distort fun-
damental tax principles to punish a particular oil company while at 
the same time leaving untouched numerous tax preferences specifi-
cally tailored to provide tax benefits to the oil industry as a whole. 
 
See Susan Crabtree, BP to Cut Tax Bill by $13B but Won’t Say what It’s Paying IRS for 
2010, TPMDC (Apr. 20, 2011, 4:45 PM), http://tpmdc.talkingpointsmemo.com/ 
2011/04/bp-to-cut-tax-bill-by-13b-isnt-saying-what-it-paid-irs-for-2010.php. 
 47 U.S. Senator Calls for Congressional Probe of BP’s Tax Deduction Plans, U.S. SENATOR 
BILL NELSON (July 29, 2010), http://billnelson.senate.gov/news/details. 
cfm?id=326794&. 
 48 H.R. 5995, 111th Cong. (2010). 
 49 See id. 
 50 H.R. 6031, 111th Cong. (2010). 
 51 See id. 
 52 See, e.g., Kim Dixon & Jeremy Pelofsky, BP Fund Tax Breaks Could Bite Back, 
REUTERS, June 17, 2010, available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE65G4Y320100617?pageNumber=1.  
 53 See Kocieniewski, supra note 6 (observing that the oil industry is among the 
most-subsidized industries). 
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III. OIL INDUSTRY PREFERENCES IN THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE 
The Code is drafted in such a way as to provide multiple tax in-
centives for the oil industry.  Since the 1970s, the tax incentives for 
the oil industry have decreased,
54
 but they still remain extremely 
high.
55
  Some of the preferential tax provisions date back almost a 
century.
56
  Income tax provisions that provide benefit to specific tax-
payers at the expense of government revenue are described as tax 
expenditures.
57
  Tax expenditures include all provisions that lower 
the tax liability of favored taxpayers.
58
  Such provisions are the func-
tional equivalent to direct spending by the government and are 
viewed as a mechanism for achieving “budget policy objectives.”
59
  
The provisions discussed below are tax expenditures in the sense that 
they confer special benefits to the oil industry.  The provisions are 
discussed in groups according to their type: (A) deductions, (B) cre-
dits, and (C) other provisions. 
A. Deductions 
As discussed in Part II, the Code allows the subtraction of certain 
outlays and expenditures from the taxpayer’s income, which are 
called deductions.
60
 
1. Percentage Depletion Deduction 
As a general matter, the Code recognizes that long-lived tangible 
assets used for business or investment purposes wear out after con-
tinued use, and it therefore allows taxpayers an annual deduction for 
depreciation to compensate for this “loss.”
61
  The depreciation deduc-
tion is limited to the basis of the property (the cost of the property to 
the taxpayer).
62
  Similarly, the depletion deduction, unique to extrac-
tion and timber businesses,
63
 allows the recovery of investments in 
 
 54 See LAZZARI, supra note 13, at 1–2 (summarizing the major features of U.S. oil 
tax policy since its inception).   
 55 Kocieniewski, supra note 6. 
 56 Id. 
 57 STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX 
EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2009–2013 3 (2010), available at 
http://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=3642. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. 
 60 CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 34, at 1. 
 61 Id. at 162; see 26 U.S.C. § 167 (2006). 
 62 CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 34, at 163. 
 63 See 26 U.S.C. § 611(a) (2006).  
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mineral property.
64
  There are two types of depletion deduction, cost 
depletion and percentage depletion, which differ in the way they are 
calculated.
65
 
Like the depreciation deduction, depletion deduction can be 
used only up to the basis of the depletable mineral property.
66
  Thus, 
a taxpayer’s recovery is limited to the investment in the property.  By 
contrast, percentage depletion is calculated as a fixed rate of the 
gross income derived from the property.
67
  What sets percentage dep-
letion apart from both depreciation and cost depletion is that the 
percentage depletion deduction is not limited to the basis that the 
taxpayer has in the property.
68
  Therefore, the sum of all percentage 
depletion deductions can exceed a taxpayer’s investment in the 
property.
69
  If production is successful, this treatment can reduce the 
tax rate substantially.
70
  The General Accounting Office estimates that 
revenue loss from the excess use of percentage depletion over cost 
depletion for the three decades prior to 2000 exceeds $82 billion.
71
  
According to the latest estimates of the Joint Committee on Taxation 
(JCT), the revenue loss for the period between 2009 and 2013 alone 
will be $6.5 billion.
72
  The original purpose of the percentage deple-
tion was to stimulate exploration and production.
73
  The depletion 
deduction and other tax incentives led to an increase in oil and gas 
production from sixteen percent of all energy in 1929 to seventy-one 
 
 64 Hymel, supra note 11, at 48.  Some scholars argue that depletion is different in 
“character and effect” from depreciation because the depletion deduction is applied 
to an asset which is the product itself, rather than to a product-producing asset.  
Wendy B. Davis, Elimination of the Depletion Deduction for Fossil Fuels,  
26 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 197, 200 (2002).  
 65 See OIL & GAS: FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 215–16 (Patrick Hennessee & Sean 
Hennessee eds., 2009) (discussing the two types of depletion deductions). 
 66 Id. at 215–16.  Cost depletion is determined by dividing the basis of the oil in-
terest by the mineral units sold during the tax year and multiplying the result (which 
is the cost per unit) by the number of units sold during the year.  Id. at 215.  
 67 Id. at 216.  The rate is fifteen percent but can increase up to twenty-five per-
cent.  Id.  This increase is triggered when the reference price of oil is below twenty 
dollars per barrel.  Id.  The depletion rate will increase one percentage point for 
every dollar the reference price is below twenty dollars.  Id.  The reference price of 
oil is based on an estimate of the unregulated crude oil prices.  Id. at 216 n.24. 
 68 Id. at 216. 
 69 Hymel, supra note 11, at 48. 
 70 Id. at 48–49. 
 71 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/RCED-00-301R, TAX INCENTIVES FOR 
PETROLEUM AND ETHANOL FUELS 7 tbl.2 (2000). 
 72 STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 57, at 31 tbl.3. 
 73 Hymel, supra note 11, at 49.  The depletion deduction was originally included 
in the Tariff Act of 1913.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 71, at 6. 
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percent of all energy in 1970.
74
  These tax provisions generally re-
sulted in more profitable, accelerated oil production and faster dep-
letion of energy resources.
75
 
2. Intangible Drilling Costs Deduction 
Intangible drilling costs (IDC) include expenditures for “wages, 
fuel, repairs, hauling, supplies, etc.” associated with the drilling and 
preparation of wells for oil production.
76
  Ordinarily, taxpayers can-
not deduct such expenses and must capitalize them.
77
  The idea be-
hind capitalization is to spread the cost of assets over the period dur-
ing which the taxpayer will benefit from these assets.
78
  An oil 
producer, however, is allowed to make a one-time election to deduct 
IDC instead of capitalizing them.
79
  Thus, the producer can recover 
IDC immediately rather than spread the recovery over several years. 
For the period between 1968 and 2000, the revenue losses from 
the IDC deduction were $42.8 billion.
80
  For the period between 2009 
and 2013, the revenue losses are estimated to be $2.6 billion.
81
  Like 
the depletion deduction, the IDC deduction was introduced in 1918 
to stimulate the then-budding oil industry.
82
 
3. Passive Activity Loss Exception 
Section 469 of the Code denies taxpayers a deduction for any 
net loss that results from a passive activity against income from other 
sources.
83
  The oil industry benefits from a special exception to this 
rule.  The Code does not consider a working interest in oil property 
 
 74 LAZZARI, supra note 13, at 3. 
 75 Id. at 2.  
 76 See Treas. Reg. § 1.612-4(a) (1965).  
 77 Hymel, supra note 11, at 49; see 26 U.S.C. § 263(a) (2006).  While some ex-
penses can be deducted immediately from income, capitalization mandates a yearly 
allowance for the exhaustion of capital assets.  CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 34, at 126.  In 
this way the cost is recovered over a period of time.  Id. 
 78 CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 34, at 126. 
 79 Treas. Reg. § 1.612-4(a) (1965).  The producer can even deduct expenses re-
lated to nonproductive wells, which represent approximately eighty percent of all 
wells drilled.  Hymel, supra note 11, at 49. 
 80 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 71, at 9 tbl.3. 
 81 STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 57, at 31 tbl.1.  The esti-
mates include revenue losses from oil and gas exploration.  Id. 
 82 133 CONG. REC. 6392 (1985) (statement of Rep. Frank Horton).  
 83 CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 34, at 316; see 26 U.S.C. § 469(a) (2006).  Passive activi-
ties are defined as activities that involve trade or business in which the taxpayer “does 
not materially participate.”  Id. § 469(c)(1). 
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to be a passive activity, regardless of a taxpayer’s actual participation.
84
  
Thus, while most taxpayers cannot use passive activity losses to offset 
income from other sources, such as wages, an oil interest owner may 
be able to do so.  The passive activity loss exception was introduced 
with the Tax Reform Act of 1986.
85
  Until 2000, the exclusion cost 
roughly $1.06 billion in lost revenue.
86
 
4. Amortization of Geological and Geophysical Expenses 
As previously explained, a taxpayer can claim an annual depre-
ciation deduction to compensate for the gradual exhaustion of cer-
tain assets
87
 and these allowances are spread over the useful life of the 
assets.
88
  Costs related to the exploration and development of oil or 
gas, called geological and geophysical (“G & G”) expense,
89
 are con-
sidered capital expenses and must be amortized.
90
  Oil producers, 
however, are entitled to accelerated amortization of G & G expenses, 
for a period as short as two years for some producers.
91
  The Energy 
Tax Policy Act of 2005 introduced the accelerated amortization pro-
vision to stimulate domestic oil production.
92
  The projected revenue 
loss from the accelerated amortization provision for the period be-
tween 2009 and 2013 is $600 million.
93
  Repealing the accelerated 
 
 84 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 71, at 11.  A working interest 
within the meaning of § 469 exists only if the taxpayer holds the interest in a way that 
does not limit his liability.  OIL & GAS: FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, supra note 65, at 
483.  One example of ownership interest that qualifies for the exception is general 
partnership interest.  Id. 
 85 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 71, at 12. 
 86 Id. at 12 tbl.5.  
 87 See CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 34, at 162. 
 88 Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-1(a) (as amended in 1972).  Useful life is not the actual 
time during which the taxpayer uses the asset but a period during which it is ex-
pected that the asset will confer a benefit to the owner.  Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)–
(1)(b) (as amended in 1972). 
 89 See 26 U.S.C. § 167(h)(1) (2006). 
 90 OIL & GAS: FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, supra note 65, at 145.  Such costs in-
clude the cost of hiring geologists, conducting various geological surveys, and drill-
ing core holes.  Id. 
 91 See § 167(h); OIL & GAS: FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, supra note 65, at 145.  In-
dependent producers and independent oil companies can amortize G & G costs rat-
ably over a two-year-period.  § 167(h).  Major integrated producers can amortize the 
costs over a seven-year period.  Id. 
 92 See MARK HOLT & CAROL GLOVER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33302, ENERGY 
POLICY ACT OF 2005: SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS OF ENACTED PROVISIONS 96 (2006).  The 
initial version of the provisions allowed for two-year amortization of G & G expenses 
for integrated oil producers, but subsequent amendments extended the period to 
seven years.  OIL & GAS: FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, supra note 65, at 145. 
 93 STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 57, at 31 tbl.1.  
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amortization provision would result in $1.1 billion revenue gains over 
a ten-year period.
94
 
5. Tertiary Injectants Deduction 
Some oil producers use tertiary recovery methods to increase the 
oil recovery from certain wells.
95
  Producers inject fluid, gaseous, and 
other chemical substances into the oil reservoir to recover oil that is 
too viscous to recover through ordinary methods.
96
  Absent special 
provisions related to those costs, the taxpayer would have to capitalize 
such costs.
97
  Section 193 of the Code, however, authorizes a deduc-
tion for the cost of tertiary injectants.
98
  In the twenty-year period be-
tween 1980 and 2000, the estimated cost of this measure was $330 
million.
99
 
B. Credits 
Tax credits are tax incentives subtracted directly from the tax 
liability of the taxpayer.
100
  Thus, a credit is a dollar-for-dollar reduc-
tion in tax liability, rather than a reduction in gross income.
101
  There 
are two major tax credits that benefit the oil industry: the enhanced 
oil recovery credit and the credit for marginal wells. 
1. Enhanced Oil Recovery Credit 
Under § 43 of the Code, oil producers are permitted to take a 
credit for qualified enhanced oil recovery (EOR) expenses.
102
  Quali-
fied EOR expenses include tangible property integral to the recovery 
project, IDC costs, and tertiary injectant expenses.
103
  To the extent 
that any of these costs are deducted under any other sections of the 
Code, the deductions must be reduced by the credit amount.
104
  Tax-
 
 94 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, BUDGET OF THE UNITED 
STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2011 186 (2010) [hereinafter ANALYTICAL 
PERSPECTIVES 2011]. 
 95 OIL & GAS: FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, supra note 65, at 518. 
 96 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 71, at 14. 
 97 See id. 
 98 See 26 U.S.C. § 193(a) (2006). 
 99 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 71, at 15 tbl.7. 
 100 CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 34, at 2. 
 101 Id. 
 102 26 U.S.C § 43 (2006). 
 103 § 43(c).  As discussed earlier, these costs must typically be capitalized.  See supra 
notes 77–78 and accompanying text. 
 104 See § 43(d); OIL & GAS: FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, supra note 65, at 515. 
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payers can earn credit for up to fifteen percent of the qualified oil re-
covery costs.
105
 
For the period between 1990 and 2000, the EOR credit cost over 
$1 billion in lost revenue.
106
  The credit’s purpose is to incentivize 
domestic oil producers by stimulating the extraction of residual oil 
from abandoned domestic wells that cannot be extracted through 
conventional extraction methods.
107
 
2. Credit for Marginal Wells 
The credit for marginal wells
108
 allows producers to offset tax lia-
bility by three dollars per barrel for oil produced from marginal 
wells.
109
  A qualified well is a well that is both domestic and has an av-
erage daily production below a certain limit.
110
  Like in the case of the 
EOR credit, when the reference price of crude oil exceeds a certain 
level, the marginal wells credit phases out gradually.
111
  The American 
Job Creations Act of 2004 created the tax credit,
112
 but it has not been 
used since its inception because crude oil prices have remained high 
since 2004.
113
  The credit was designed to keep domestic supply at a 
maximum even at times of low oil prices,
114
 but there is no empirical 
data about the credit’s actual effect because it has never been used. 
C. Other Provisions 
Some generally applicable Code provisions confer disproportio-
nate benefits to the oil industry as well.  These provisions are dis-
cussed in some detail in this subsection. 
 
 105 § 43(a).  The credit availability depends on the price of crude oil and it is 
phased out ratably when the price exceeds twenty-eight dollars per barrel.  OIL & GAS: 
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, supra note 65, at 515.  A complete phase-out occurs when 
the reference price exceeds the statutory limit by six dollars per barrel.  Id.   
 106 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 71, at 13. 
 107 ENERGY INFORMATION ADMIN., FEDERAL FINANCIAL INTERVENTIONS AND SUBSIDIES 
IN ENERGY MARKETS 2007 137 (2007), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/ 
oiaf/servicerpt/subsidy2/pdf/subsidy08.pdf.   
 108 See 26 U.S.C § 45I (2006). 
 109 See OIL & GAS: FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, supra note 65, at 522. 
 110 Id. at 522–23.  
 111 See id. at 523.  The reference price limit is fifteen dollars per barrel.  Id.  After 
the reference price passes this mark, the credit is reduced proportionately.  Id.  Once 
the reference price of crude oil reaches eighteen dollars per barrel, the credit is 
completely phased out.  Id. 
 112 Id. at 522. 
 113 ROBERT PIROG, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R 41139, OIL INDUSTRY TAX ISSUES IN THE 
FISCAL YEAR 2011 BUDGET PROPOSAL 3, 4 (2010).   
 114 Id. at 3.  
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1. Foreign Tax Credit 
Foreign countries may exercise their tax power to levy taxes on 
income earned by foreigners within their territory.
115
  To avoid taxing 
American taxpayers twice on income earned abroad, the United 
States allows taxpayers to claim credit for income taxes paid or ac-
crued abroad.
116
  When a foreign levy is a compulsory payment under 
a foreign state’s taxation power, it is a creditable tax.
117
  But if the tax-
payer receives an economic benefit in exchange for the payment, the 
levy is not a creditable tax.
118
  A taxpayer who is both subject to a for-
eign levy and receives some economic benefit from the foreign coun-
try is designated as a dual-capacity taxpayer.
119
  In some cases the 
whole levy may not qualify for a credit, but the taxpayer has the op-
tion of demonstrating that he can credit at least a part of the levy 
against domestic tax liability.
120
 
Section 907
121
 of the Code caps the amount of the credit availa-
ble for foreign oil and gas income at the tax liability such income 
would create under the applicable U.S. tax rate.
122
  Although § 907 
was enacted to restrict the ability of oil companies to claim foreign 
tax credit for special payments, it does not prevent them from taking 
credit for disguised royalties.
123
  Sometimes it is simply not clear 
whether a payment that an oil company made was in exchange for an 
economic benefit (royalty) or not.  Thus, oil companies may get im-
 
 115 JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, PRESENT LAW ENERGY-RELATED TAX PROVISIONS AND 
PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS CONTAINED IN THE PRESIDENT’S FISCAL YEAR 2011 BUDGET 85 
(2010), available at http://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=3678. 
 116 Id. 
 117 Id. 
 118 See Treas. Reg. § 1.901-2(a)(ii)(2) (as amended in 2011).  An economic benefit 
is a benefit that is not made available under the general income tax system of the 
foreign country to other taxpayers.  JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 115, at 85. 
 119 JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 115, at 85. 
 120 OIL & GAS: FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, supra note 65, at 580.  There are two 
methods that a taxpayer can use to demonstrate payment of creditable tax.  First, a 
safe harbor authorizes the taxpayer to credit a portion of the levy that is equivalent to 
the amount that the taxpayer would have paid under the generally applicable in-
come tax of the foreign country.  See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 115, at 86.  
The remainder of the levy is not creditable.  See id.  If the foreign country does not 
impose a generally applicable income tax, the taxpayer can claim a credit for a por-
tion of the levy that the taxpayer would have to pay under the U.S. income tax rate.  
See id.  Alternatively, the taxpayer may chose to show that, in light of all facts and cir-
cumstances, a certain levy is a tax.  See id.  
 121 See 26 U.S.C. § 907 (2006). 
 122 See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 115, at 88. 
 123 ENVTL. LAW INST., ESTIMATING U.S. GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES TO ENERGY SOURCES: 
2002–2008 10 (2009). 
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proper tax benefits by relying on the foreign tax credit.
124
  For the pe-
riod between 2002 and 2008, the estimated revenue losses from such 
practices were $15.3 billion.
125
 
2. Domestic Manufacturing Deduction 
The domestic manufacturing deduction is a generally applicable 
deduction for manufacturing activities performed within the United 
States.
126
  The deduction is a statutory percentage of the lesser of the 
taxpayer’s qualified production activity income or the taxpayer’s tax-
able income.
127
  The American Job Creation Act added § 199 to the 
Code in 2004, and the purpose of the Act was to expand employment 
in the manufacturing sector of the U.S. economy.
128
 
 
 124 In the 1950s, certain oil-producing countries reclassified royalties from U.S. oil 
companies as income taxes based on a suggestion by the State Department.  Id.  De-
spite the restrictions on this practice that followed in later years, major oil-producing 
countries continue to impose higher income tax rates on oil businesses than on oth-
er taxpayers. See id.  For example, in Saudi Arabia the income tax rate for oil-
producing businesses is eighty-five percent, but the income tax rate for non-oil busi-
nesses is twenty percent; in Nigeria, the income tax rate for oil companies is eighty 
percent, but the general income tax rate is thirty percent.  Id. 
     The subsidy that oil companies are entitled to receive under the current rules can 
be best illustrated through an example.  The following example is adapted from 
ESTIMATING U.S. GOVERNMENTAL SUBSIDIES TO ENERGY SOURCES: 2002–2008 published 
by the ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE.  See id. at 11.  Country A imposes a general 
income tax rate of twenty percent but levies fifty percent taxes on oil companies.  If a 
U.S. oil company has taxable income of $1,000, it pays $500 in taxes to country A, 
and can claim tax credit of $350 against U.S. tax liability (limited to thirty-five per-
cent of taxable income).  See id.  They can carry the $150 difference forward for up to 
ten years.  See id.  Thus, the difference between the payment that the company would 
have made under the twenty-percent tax rate and the special fifty-percent rate is not 
recognized as a royalty.  See id.  If the difference is treated as a royalty payment, the 
taxpayer would be considered to have paid only $200 in income tax to country A 
(based on the generally applicable twenty-percent tax rate) and would be entitled to 
foreign tax credit of only $200.  See id.  The remaining $300 are deductible by the 
company but are not counted towards the credit.  See id.  The revenue loss for the 
Treasury is the difference between the credit available under the first scenario and 
the second scenario reduced by the effect of the deduction: ($350 - $200) * .65 = 
$97.5.  See id. at 11. 
 125 Id. at 7. 
 126 See 26 U.S.C. § 199(c)(4) (2006).  The deduction applies to income derived 
from qualifying property that has been “manufactured, produced, grown or ex-
tracted” in the United States.  See id. 
 127 OIL & GAS: FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, supra note 65, at 499; JOINT COMM. ON 
TAXATION, supra note 115, at 72.  The statutory percentage limit for 2009 was six per-
cent.  JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 115, at 72.  The percentage is set at nine 
percent for 2010.  OIL & GAS: FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, supra note 65, at 499. 
 128 Id. 
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Although the oil industry is designated as a manufacturing in-
dustry for reporting purposes, it differs significantly from other man-
ufacturing industries.
129
  Unlike manufacturing, the production level 
is only indirectly related to the level of employment, and a much big-
ger portion of oil industry investments are capital in nature.
130
  In ad-
dition, since the high prices of oil during the last few years have 
spurred record profits for oil companies, oil prices are more likely to 
influence capital investment decisions in the industry.
131
  Thus, it 
seems unlikely that the domestic manufacturing credit will play a sig-
nificant role in oil companies’ employment decisions.  Repealing the 
deduction for the oil industry alone would eliminate $7.3 billion in 
tax expenditures over four years.
132
 
3. LIFO Method of Accounting for Inventories 
The “last-in, first-out” (LIFO) method is a method of accounting 
for inventories.
133
  It authorizes companies to record as “sold first” the 
products that the company acquired last.
134
  The LIFO method closely 
reflects the current inventory costs,
135
 despite the fact that often the 
company bought the goods at a lower price.
136
  In a world of rising 
prices, LIFO permits companies to declare a higher measure of costs 
of goods sold and thus lower income, as compared to the “first-in, 
first-out” (FIFO) method of accounting.
137
  Another criticism of LIFO 
 
 129 Id. 
 130 Id.  Therefore, if the deduction lowers oil companies’ production and labor 
costs, it is unlikely that they will employ more people.  Id.  Any increase in employ-
ment would likely be minor.  Id. 
 131 Id. at 5. 
 132 Id. at 2 tbl.1. 
 133 See 26 U.S.C. § 467 (2006). 
 134 § 467(b). 
 135 JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 115, at 78. 
 136 David Reilly, Outside Audit: Big Oil’s Accounting Methods Fuel Criticism—LIFO 
Leaves the Likes of Exxon with Big Balance-Sheet Reserves as Gas-Pump Prices Slam Drivers, 
WALL ST. J., Aug. 8, 2006, at C1. 
 137 JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 115, at 78; see Reilly, supra note 136.  Al-
ternatively, if prices are falling, LIFO would produce lower measures of goods sold 
and higher income.  Cf. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 115, at 78.  Some pro-
ponents of the LIFO method argue that it shields companies from the effect of infla-
tion by matching current revenue with current costs.  Reilly, supra note 136.  But the 
method also allows companies to declare higher inventory costs provided that assets 
were purchased at a lower cost initially.  Id.  The inventory that a company carries 
from the end of one year to the next under LIFO can relate back to the year when 
the company adopted the method, which may go back decades.  Id.  Notably, LIFO 
has been used since the 1930s.  Id.  Thus, LIFO can be over-inclusive because it al-
lows the taxpayer to shield income beyond the mere effects of inflation.  Id.  
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is that it provides selective and preferential protection for inflationary 
gains because only businesses with physical inventories can use it.
138
  
Also, LIFO is not generally accepted internationally.
139
 
In addition to the oil industry, LIFO is available to many retailers 
and manufacturers.
140
  Empirical evidence shows, however, that the 
oil industry benefits disproportionately from its use.
141
  While the av-
erage difference between “[the] amount reported under LIFO and 
[the] market value of inventory” is 15%, for Exxon Mobil, for exam-
ple, this difference is 200%.
142
  In 2006, the JCT predicted that the ef-
fect of repealing LIFO for the oil industry would bring $4.3 billion in 
tax revenue.
143
 
IV. SHOULD CONGRESS REPEAL OIL TAX INCENTIVES? 
Reviewing the multiple ways in which oil companies receive dis-
proportionate tax benefits indicates that allowing BP to take a gener-
ally applicable deduction is not the real tax policy problem.  But pro-
ponents of oil industry tax subsidies advance various arguments why 
these subsidies should be part of the Code.  Historically, the propo-
nents have cited various justifications for the tax subsidies, including 
that the subsidies provide support for the industry in its infancy, de-
velop the industry for national security purposes, benefit consumers, 
and mitigate the high economic risks associated with the oil indus-
try.
144
  As the analysis below demonstrates, though, none of these rea-
sons sufficiently justifies the need for oil tax incentives today.  There-
fore, Congress should consider repealing the incentives. 
One of the oldest justifications for subsidizing the oil industry is 
the infant industry theory.  One of the first proponents of the theory 
was Alexander Hamilton, who believed that the government is justi-
 
 138 Edward D. Kleinbard et al., Is It Time to Liquidate LIFO?, 113 TAX NOTES 237, 
238 (2006). 
 139 The European Union, for example, does not allow the use of LIFO.  Reilly, su-
pra note 136. 
 140 See Kleinbard et al., supra note 138, at 243 (noting that LIFO is used by “many 
retailers and manufacturers”). 
 141 According to one estimate, in 2005, Exxon Mobil reported LIFO inventories of 
$7.8 billion when the market value of the inventory without the use of LIFO would 
have been $15.4 billion more.  See Corporate Tax Issues: Hearing on H.R. 4297 Before the 
Subcomm. on Finance, 109th Cong. (2006) (testimony of Prof. George Plesko). 
 142 Id. 
 143 Id. 
 144 See infra notes 145–71 and accompanying text. 
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fied in granting monopolies to new and risky trades.
145
  Later, the 
theory incorporated the use of “subsidies, tariffs, and quantitative re-
strictions” to achieve the same purpose.
146
  The infant industry theory 
seeks to help an industry that is not currently competitive grow 
through temporary government protection.
147
 
In the beginning of the twentieth century, the federal govern-
ment perceived the potential of fossil fuels and directed incentives to 
help develop the budding industry.
148
  Today, however, this justifica-
tion is inapplicable.  Even though the oil industry was in its infancy at 
the beginning of the twentieth century,
149
 currently it is one of the 
most profitable sectors of the economy,
150
 not only domestically but 
globally.  Domestic oil production has increased more than thirty-fold 
since the early 1900s.
151
  Today, the oil industry is mature, competi-
tive, and highly profitable, rendering a governmental boost unneces-
sary.  Furthermore, infant industry theory necessarily requires that 
government protects the industry temporarily.
152
  By contrast, some of 
the oil subsidies have existed for almost a century, and all of them are 
permanent provisions of the Code.
153
  The oil industry is too devel-
oped and has received assistance for too long to fit within the funda-
mental rationales of infant industry theory. 
Another frequently used argument is the national security or de-
fense argument.  Proponents suggest that subsidies are necessary for 
maintaining domestic oil production for national security purposes.
154
  
This argument focuses on the external non-market costs that can re-
sult from oil imports, such as the risk of disproportionate depen-
 
 145 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 828 (John Eatwell et al. eds., 
1987) [hereinafter PALGRAVE].  
 146 Id. at 829. 
 147 See id.  
 148 See Hymel, supra note 11, at 47. 
 149 Id. 
 150 The two most profitable companies for 2009 on the Fortune 500 list were Ex-
xon Mobil and Chevron.  See Fortune 500, FORTUNE, http://money.cnn.com/ 
magazines/fortune/fortune500/2009/performers/companies/profits/ (last visited 
Sept. 28, 2011). 
 151 The calculation is based on data from the U.S. Energy Information Adminis-
tration, which reports production levels at 63,621 thousand barrels per annum in the 
beginning of the 1900s and 1,998,137 thousand barrels per annum in 2011.  See Petro-
leum & Other Liquids, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. INDEP. STATISTICS & ANALYSIS (July 28, 
2011), http://www.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s= 
MCRFPUS1&f=A.  
 152 See 2 PLAGRAVE, supra note 145, at 829. 
 153 See discussion supra Part III. 
 154 Hymel, supra note 11, at 68. 
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dence on oil imports from hostile or politically unstable countries.
155
  
This risk is associated with possible disruptions in supply and the 
costs of ensuring supply levels.
156
  A tariff on oil imports could be an 
effective policy step to address these risks.
157
  Nevertheless, such ac-
tion could be challenged as contrary to the United States’ obligations 
under international trade agreements, and this has lead policy-
makers to implement subsidies instead.
158
 
Oil tax subsidies, however, have failed to immunize the U.S. 
economy against the risks associated with dependence on foreign oil 
imports.
159
 It is true that domestic production facilitates the creation 
of a domestic oil reserve that can be diverted for national defense 
and military purposes without causing a civilian shortage in the case 
of a supply disruption.
160
  But it is also true that U.S. oil consumption 
continues to exceed production and thus continues to expose the 
economy to the risks of dependence on oil imports.
161
  More impor-
tantly, some of the subsidies support foreign oil production.
162
  Al-
though many of the biggest subsidies to the domestic oil industry 
have been available for years and even decades,
163
 oil imports have 
grown steadily throughout the years.
164
  Thus, the assertion that tax 
subsidies reduce oil imports seems doubtful in reality. 
 
 155 See SALVATORE LAZZARI, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. RL 30406, ENERGY TAX POLICY: 
AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 11 (2005). 
 156 See id. 
 157 Id. 
 158 Id.  Whether an oil import tariff could be successfully challenged as a violation 
of United States’ obligations under international trade agreements is debatable.  For 
example, the prohibition against quantitative restrictions on trade under the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) is subject to a number of exceptions, in-
cluding the national security exception under Article XXI.  See U.N. CONFERENCE ON 
TRADE & DEV., TRADE AGREEMENTS, PETROLEUM AND ENERGY POLICIES, at 2, U.N. Doc. 
UNCTAD/ITCD/TSB/9 (2000), available at 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/poitcdtsbd9.en.pdf.  In fact, crude oil tariffs are 
not subject to the World Trade Organization (WTO) system and the United States 
could impose a higher tariff on crude oil imports than the tariff currently in force 
without violating its obligations.  See id. at 117.  A more detailed analysis of this issue 
is beyond the scope of this Comment.  
 159 Hymel, supra note 11, at 70. 
 160 Id. at 70–71. 
 161 Id. at 71. 
 162 One such example is the foreign tax credit.  See supra Part III.B.1.  
 163 One example is the percentage depletion deduction which has been available 
for almost a century.  See Hymel, supra note 11, at 48. 
 164 See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW 2009 129 tbl.5.1 (2009), 
available at http://www.eia.gov/emeu/aer/pdf/aer.pdf. 
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Another argument for maintaining oil subsidies is that they 
compensate for the high risk inherent in the industry.
165
  The reason-
ing behind this proposition is that the high volatility of oil prices in-
creases the risk of under-investment in the industry.
166
  The oil indus-
try contends that without the current subsidies, the inherent industry 
risks will lead to domestic job losses.
167
  Studies on the effect of oil tax 
subsidies on risk, though, have not confirmed conclusively that such 
subsidies are indeed beneficial.
168
  Furthermore, to some extent “all 
prices fluctuate in a free market.”
169
  Thus, most subsidies do not 
seem to be directed toward stabilizing prices. 
The risks to the job market are also overstated.  The oil industry 
is capital-intensive and subsidizing it is likely to have limited effect on 
labor demand.
170
  Some estimate that repeal of the subsidies will not 
lead to a significant reduction in domestic production levels either, 
resulting in possible reduction in employment levels of no more than 
0.5%.
171
 
Not only do tax subsidies lack sufficient justification, but they al-
so seem wasteful in light of the federal budget deficit.  The deficit has 
reached its highest levels since World War II.
172
  It is expected to 
reach eighty percent of gross domestic product (GDP) by 2015.
173
  As 
Senator Bernard Sanders stated, repealing oil industry tax subsidies 
“could be an important step forward” to deficit reduction.
174
  A repeal 
of the oil tax subsidies discussed in Part II would result in $36.5 bil-
lion in revenue over a ten-year period.
175
  This revenue could either 
be applied directly towards deficit reduction or provide valuable 
funds for other programs without burdening the current deficit. 
 
 165 See Hymel, supra note 11, at 68. 
 166 See LAZZARI, supra note 155, at 12.  
 167 See Kocieniewski, supra note 6.    
 168 See Hymel, supra note 11, at 69 (“[W]hen risk is evaluated, studies indicate that 
the benefit of oil and gas tax incentives is not clear.”). 
 169 See LAZZARI, supra note 155, at 12. 
 170 See PIROG, supra note 113, at 4. 
 171 Oil and Gas Tax Provisions: A Consideration of the President’s FY 2010 Budget Pro-
posal Before the Subcomm. on Energy, Natural Res. and Infrastructure of the Subcomm. on 
Fin., 111th Cong. 5–6 (2010) (statement of Alan Krueger, Assistant Sec’y for Econ. 
Policy, Dep’t of Treasury).  
 172 See INTL. MONETARY FUND, UNITED STATES: SELECTED ISSUES PAPER 37 (2010). 
 173 Id.  
 174 156 CONG. REC. S4912 (daily ed., June 15, 2010) (statement of Sen. Bernard 
Sanders). 
 175 See ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES 2011, supra note 94, at 186. 
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Supporters of oil subsidies often assume that the subsidies will 
pass through oil producers and benefit consumers.
176
  Lower prices 
for consumers can be reasonably expected when the industry is price-
competitive.  Oil prices, however, may not be competitive enough.  In 
the international market, crude oil prices are largely determined by 
the Organization of Oil Producing Nations (OPEC).
177
  In addition, 
the domestic petroleum industry seems to be highly concentrated, 
which presents an additional obstacle for competitive pricing.
178
  If 
the industry is sufficiently concentrated and non-competitive, subsi-
dies are likely to benefit producers far more than they benefit con-
sumers. 
Perhaps the strongest argument against oil subsidies is the eco-
nomic vulnerability created by excessive oil dependence.  In 2006, 
President Bush articulated these economic risks when he stated that 
“America is addicted to oil” and recognized the need to “move 
beyond a petroleum-based economy.”
179
  America’s oil demand has 
been rising rapidly over the past century and is yet to reach its highest 
point.
180
  At the same time, global oil demand has risen too, largely 
driven by developing countries such as China and India.
181
  Failure of 
oil supply to keep up with the growing demand could cause prices to 
rise, which could have negative effect on an oil-dependent economy.  
The robust governmental support for the oil industry throughout the 
 
 176 See, e.g., RONALD J. SUTHERLAND, CATO INST., POLICY ANALYSIS NO. 390, “BIG 
OIL” AT THE PUBLIC TROUGH?  AN EXAMINATION OF PETROLEUM SUBSIDIES 4 (2001), 
available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa390.pdf (“Moreover, the benefits bes-
towed by subsidies are reduced by competition and captured, in part, by others, pri-
marily consumers.”). 
 177 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, GASOLINE PRICE CHANGE: THE DYNAMIC OF SUPPLY, 
DEMAND, AND COMPETITION 14 (2005), available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/ 
gasprices05/050705gaspricesrpt.pdf. 
 178 There are forty-five oil-refining firms in the United States, of which ten capture 
seventy-five percent of the refining market.  ANTHONY ANDREWS ET AL., CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., R 41478, THE U.S. OIL REFINING INDUSTRY: BACKGROUND IN CHANGING 
MARKETS AND FUEL POLICIES 17–18 fig.9 (2010).  See generally U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-96, ENERGY MARKETS: EFFECT OF MERGERS AND 
MARKET CONCENTRATION IN THE U.S. PETROLEUM INDUSTRY (2004) (determining that 
market concentration has substantially increased).  
 179 President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Jan. 31, 2006), availa-
ble at http://www.c-span.org/executive/transcript.asp?cat=current&code=bush_ 
admin&year=2006. 
 180 See Hymel, supra note 11, at 53.  
 181 In 2003, “China surpassed Japan to become the world’s second largest con-
sumer of petroleum products,” while between 1987 and 2001 India’s demand 
doubled.  See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 177, at 19.   
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years contributes to the problem.
182
  Reducing petroleum depen-
dence has become one of President Obama’s central policy goals.
183
  
Both the current and the previous administrations ushered in various 
tax incentives designed to support the development of renewable 
energy industries to increase energy efficiency and conservation.
184
 
Tax incentives for alternative energy are just one part of the so-
lution to the oil dependence problem.  Despite efforts to stimulate 
alternative energy, favorable tax provisions for the oil industry still 
remain firmly in place.  Maintaining subsidies for both alternative 
and traditional energy sources “is clearly inconsistent with the policy 
goal of moving energy policy in the direction of renewable sources.”
185
  
Not only would cutting oil tax subsidies be “a beneficial undertak-
ing”
186
 but it is also a necessary condition for a permanent solution to 
the oil dependence problem. 
The current Obama Administration considers reduction of de-
pendence on fossil fuels one of its primary domestic goals.
187
  Consis-
tent with this commitment, the Administration has taken steps to ad-
dress the fossil fuel tax subsidies.  For example, President Obama’s 
proposed budget for 2011 envisioned the elimination of the prefe-
rential tax treatment for fossil fuels.
188
  The budget proposed the re-
peal of the percentage depletion deduction, the IDC deduction, the 
exception for passive activity loss for oil and gas interests, the tertiary 
injectants deduction, the EOR credit, the marginal wells credit, and 
the domestic manufacturing deduction for the oil industry.
189
  The 
budget also recommended the two-year amortization period for D & 
 
 182 Oil dependence could be linked to oil’s dominance as a transportation fuel, 
which can be traced to “a century of favorable government policies and deeply in-
grained cultural patterns.”  DAVID SANDALOW, THE BROOKINGS INST., ENDING OIL 
DEPENDENCE 2 (2007), available at http://www.brookings.edu/views/papers/ 
fellows/sandalow20070122.pdf.   
 183 See, e.g., President’s Remarks, supra note 3 (declaring determination for transi-
tion away from fossil fuels and emphasizing the long-term environmental, economic, 
and security costs that will result from maintaining the status quo). 
 184 For example, President Obama signed into law the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009, which extended the eligibility dates for the renewable 
electricity production credit.  Pub. L. No. 111-5, div. B, tit. II, § 1101, 123 Stat. 115, 
318 (codified as note to 26 USC § 45) . 
 185 Roberta Mann, Back to the Future: Recommendations and Predictions for Greener Tax 
Policy, 88 OR. L. REV. 355, 376 (2009). 
 186 Id. 
 187 See Jad Mouawad, Obama Tries to Draw up an Inclusive Energy Plan, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 18, 2009, at B1. 
 188 See ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES 2011, supra note 94, at 177. 
 189 Id.  
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D expenses applicable to independent oil companies to be equalized 
with the seven-year period available to integrated oil producers.
190
  
The budget proposal also incorporated reforms in the foreign tax 
credit for dual-capacity tax payers, which would not allow such tax-
payers to claim credit for the amount of a foreign levy that exceeded 
the generally applicable levy in the foreign country.
191
  In addition, 
the budget proposed the extension, modification, and enactment of 
tax incentives for energy conservation and alternative energy.
192
  The 
President’s budget for fiscal year 2012 included similar proposals.
193
  
Neither proposal was successful. 
 After the BP spill, legislators were quick to harness the atmos-
phere of public discontent towards the oil industry and introduced 
two new repeal bills in the Senate.  In May 2010, Senator Robert Me-
nendez introduced a bill entitled the Close Big Oil Tax Loopholes 
Act, which essentially mimics the 2011 budget proposal.
194
  In June 
2010, Senator Bernard Sanders followed with an amendment to the 
Unemployment Compensation Extension Act of 2010 that proposed 
cutting the percentage depletion deduction, the IDC deduction, and 
the manufacturing credit for oil and gas activities.
195
  The amendment 
failed to muster even a simple majority in Senate as only thirty-five 
senators voted in its favor.
196
  Notably, the vote occurred right in the 
midst of the BP oil spill crisis; even this fact did not give momentum 
to the proposed legislation.  A similar effort to repeal tax breaks for 
the oil industry failed in Senate in May 2011.
197
 
Judging by these failures, the odds that Congress will repeal oil 
tax subsidies in the near future are slim.  The oil industry’s strong 
lobby in Washington, especially as compared to the alternative energy 
industry’s lobby, could reduce these chances even further.
198
  Last but 
 
 190 Id. 
 191 U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION’S 
FISCAL YEAR 2011 REVENUE PROPOSALS 49 (2010) [hereinafter GREEN BOOK]. 
 192 See generally ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES 2011, supra note 94.  A detailed discussion 
of these provisions is beyond the scope of this Comment.   
 193 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ANALYTICAL 
PERSPECTIVES, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2012 204 
(2011). 
 194 See S. 3405, 111th Cong. (2010).  There has been no vote on the bill. 
 195 156 CONG. REC. S4753–54 (daily ed. June 15, 2010). 
 196 Donna Smith, Effort to Repeal Oil Tax Breaks Fails in Senate, REUTERS, June 15, 
2010, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE65F01820100616. 
 197 John Nolen, Senate Blocks Bill Repealing $2 billion in Oil Tax Breaks, CBSNEWS 
(May 17, 2011), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-20063724-503544.html. 
 198 Over the past twelve years, oil and gas interest groups contributed over $288 
million to members of Congress.  Oil & Gas: Long-Term Contribution Trends, OPEN 
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not least, oil exporting countries are the fourth largest holder of U.S. 
treasury securities.
199
  This fact may serve as a further incentive to 
maintain the status quo of generous oil subsidies. 
V. FURTHER PROBLEMS AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 
A. The Effect of Repeal 
Repealing oil tax subsidies may not be sufficient to address all 
problems without additional measures in place.  The first problem is 
directly related to the incentives for oil production and oil consump-
tion.  By cutting oil tax subsidies and making the cost of production 
higher than it currently is, the Obama Administration hopes to dis-
courage overproduction of oil.
200
  In reality, however, terminating tax 
incentives is unlikely to cause a decrease in oil production levels.  The 
subsidies are dwarfed by high profits.
201
  A repeal will yield as much as 
$36.5 billion in government revenue over a ten-year period.
202
  But 
from the perspective of oil companies, the cost of repealing the per-
centage depletion deduction, the domestic manufacturing credit, 
and the IDC deduction represents less than one percent of total oil 
revenues.
203
  The market itself, driven by strong demand, would likely 
provide sufficient incentives for the domestic production of oil even 
without subsidies.
204
  Thus, repeal alone would not be sufficient to 
counteract the strong market incentives for oil production. 
Some have also suggested that repealing the subsidies may in-
crease fossil fuel prices, which could lead to both reduced consump-
 
SECRETS, http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/totals.php?cycle=2010&ind=E01 
(last visited Jan. 06, 2012).  During the same time period of time, alternative energy 
interest groups contributed $8.4 million.  Alternative Energy Production & Services: 
Long-Term Contribution Trends, OPEN SECRETS, http://www.opensecrets.org/ 
industries/totals.php?cycle=2010&ind=E1500 (last visited Jan. 6, 2012). 
 199 See Major Foreign Holders of Treasury Securities, TREASURY, 
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/tic/Documents/mfh.txt 
(last visited Jan. 5, 2012).  In October 2011, Ecuador, Venezuela, Indonesia, Bahrain, 
Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Algeria, 
Gabon, Libya, and Nigeria collectively held more than $226 billion in treasury securi-
ties, surpassed only by China, Japan, and the United Kingdom.  See id.  
 200 See GREEN BOOK, supra note 191, at 75–90. 
 201 Crude oil production’s return on revenues was 19.8%  for 2008—the highest 
among all industries.  See Top Industries: Most Profitable, FORTUNE (July 20, 2009), 
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/global500/2009/performers/industries
/profits/. 
 202 See ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES 2011, supra note 94, at 186. 
 203 156 CONG. REC. S4911 (daily ed. June 15, 2010) (statement of Sen. Bernard 
Sanders). 
 204 See PIROG, supra note 113, at 6.  
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tion of oil products and increased consumption of renewable energy 
resources.
205
  This argument, however, seems misplaced because sub-
sidies for oil producers are not the major determinant of consumer 
oil prices.  Oil products are refined from crude oil.  In the United 
States gasoline accounts for roughly forty-five percent of all oil use 
and is the most important oil product.
206
  The next most widely-used 
oil-based fuel groups are distillate fuel oil products (diesel, heating 
oil and other fuels), jet fuel, and residual fuel oil.
207
  Although differ-
ent factors affect fuel prices,
208
 the price of crude oil is the biggest 
component of consumer price of most of these fuel products,
209
 and it 
depends mainly on the supply and demand in the world oil mar-
kets.
210
  The growing industrialization of developing countries in-
creases their oil demand.
211
  On the supply side, OPEC’s policy of set-
ting production ceilings for its members has been an important 
determinant for oil prices.
212
  Because subsidies are not the key factor 
 
 205 STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 57, at 131. 
 206 See Demand, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. INDEP. STATISTICS & ANALYSIS, 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/oil_gas/petroleum/analysis_publications/oil_market_
basics/demand_text.htm#U.S.%20Consumption%20by%20Product (last visited Jan. 
6, 2012). 
 207 Id. 
 208 See, e.g., Factors Affecting Gasoline Prices, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. INDEP. 
STATISTICS & ANALYSIS, http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/energyexplained/index. 
cfm?page=gasoline_factors_affecting_prices (last updated May 19, 2011); see also Fac-
tors Affecting Diesel Prices, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. INDEP. STATISTICS & ANALYSIS, 
http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/energyexplained/index.cfm?page=diesel_factors_affecting
_prices (last updated July 19, 2011); Factors Affecting Heating Oil Prices, U.S. ENERGY 
INFO. ADMIN. INDEP. STATISTICS & ANALYSIS, 
http://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/index.cfm?page=heating_oil_factors_affecting
_prices (last updated July 19, 2011). 
 209 See Factors Affecting Gasoline Prices, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. INDEP. STATISTICS & 
ANALYSIS, 
http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/energyexplained/index.cfm?page=gasoline_factors_affecti
ng_prices (last updated June 29, 2011) (fifty-three percent average); Diesel Prices & 
Outlook, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. INDEP. STATISTICS & ANALYSIS, 
http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/energyexplained/index.cfm?page=diesel_prices (last up-
dated July 1, 2011) (sixty-two percent); Heating Oil Prices & Outlook, U.S. ENERGY INFO. 
ADMIN. INDEP. STATISTICS & ANALYSIS, http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/energyexplained/ 
index.cfm?page=heating_oil_prices (last updated August 18, 2011) (sixty-eight per-
cent).  
 210 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-283, CRUDE OIL: UNCERTAINTY 
ABOUT FUTURE OIL SUPPLY MAKES IT IMPORTANT TO DEVELOP A STRATEGY FOR 
ADDRESSING A PEAK AND DECLINE OF OIL PRODUCTION 10 (2007).  
 211 FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 177, at 18.  
 212 Although OPEC has used its market leverage with varied success, studies indi-
cate that OPEC has generally “been successful in exercising a significant degree of 
market power in obtaining prices above competitive levels.”  Id. at 23.   OPEC’s crude 
oil production accounts for a lesser percentage of global production than in the 
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determining oil prices, their repeal will likely affect prices minimally.  
Consequently, consumption would not decrease either. 
Failure to deal with oil dependence comes at a cost.  Defense 
spending is largely affected by the need to secure continuous supply 
of oil.
213
  OPEC countries, the largest numbers of which are located in 
the Middle East, hold eighty percent of world oil reserves.
214
  Iraq and 
Iran, for example, face significant political risks such as civil war, 
coup, or general strike.
215
  Most recently, unrest in Libya, as well as 
across other countries in the Middle East, caused oil prices to soar 
because of fears that supplies could be disrupted.
216
  Although it may 
be difficult to allocate military spending in the Middle East to secur-
ing American energy needs, it is plausible to infer that a significant 
portion of defense spending is for energy security purposes.
217
  In 
1996, it was estimated that securing oil supplies in the region cost an-
ywhere between $6 billion and $60 billion a year.
218
  Thus, ensuring 
oil security is an expensive endeavor.  There is overwhelming agree-
ment in the scholarly community that the road to better energy secu-
rity is reduction in the overall oil consumption, rather than increase 
in domestic production at the expense of oil imports.
219
 
 
1970s, but OPEC still produces a large enough share of crude oil to influence strong-
ly oil prices.  See id. at 14. 
 213 See generally Roger J. Stern, United States Cost of Military Force Projection in the Per-
sian Gulf, 1976–2007, 38 ENERGY POL’Y 2816 (2010). 
 214 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 210, at 15.  “OPEC controls 
most of the estimated world oil reserves” and OPEC’s decisions may affect “future oil 
exploration and production.”  Id. at 4, 25.  The current OPEC members are Algeria, 
Angola, Ecuador, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab 
Emirates, and Venezuela. Member Countries, ORG. PETROLEUM EXP. COUNTRIES, 
http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/25.htm (last visited Jan. 6, 2012). 
 215 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 210, at 21.  Together with Vene-
zuela and Nigeria, which face the same high degree of political risk, these countries 
account for more than one third of world oil reserves.  Id. at 21–22. 
 216 Grant Smith & Lananh Nguyen, Oil-Price Swings Double as Unrest Spreads Before 
Saudi Talks, BLOOMBERG (Feb 21, 2011, 12:11 PM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-02-21/oil-price-swings-double-on-middle-
east-unrest-as-producers-meet-in-riyadh.html. 
 217 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 210, at 21–22. 
 218 Id. 
 219 See Roberta Mann, On The Road Again: How Tax Policy Drives Transportation 
Choices, 24 VA. TAX REV. 587, 599 (2005); Heather Ross, Producing Oil or Reducing Oil: 
Which is Better for U.S. Energy Security?, 148 RESOURCES 18, 19 (2002), available at 
http://www.rff.org/rff/Documents/RFF-Resources-148-oil.pdf (“[D]emand reduc-
tions will continue to offer the best hope for a secure energy future.”); Michael A. 
Toman, International Oil Security: Problems & Policies, 20 BROOKINGS REV. 20, 23 (2002) 
(“The key to increasing U.S. energy security, from a macroeconomic perspective, is 
reducing the petroleum intensity of economic activity.”). 
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Another cost of excessive oil use is the detrimental effect it has 
on the environment.  Damage includes air and water pollution, land 
deterioration, and dangers to human health.
220
  The BP oil spill is a 
prime example of the environmental risks that the quest for securing 
oil supplies carries.  Similarly, motor vehicles, which use oil-based fuel 
products, are responsible for large quantities of the toxic emissions in 
the air, including “[c]arbon monoxide, hydrocarbons, nitrogen 
oxides, and particulate matter . . . produced by fossil fuel combus-
tion.”
221
  Combustion of fossil fuels, including oil, also emits carbon 
dioxide, which has been linked to global warming.
222
  These detri-
mental effects impose costs on society that the market fails to take in-
to account.
223
  Therefore, corrective measures are necessary to ac-
count for these costs.
224
  Although repealing tax subsidies for oil 
production is sound policy in other regards, it cannot compensate for 
the external costs of pollution and other environmental damage.
225
  
Usually, negative externalities call for a separate tax.
226
 
The third—and perhaps most serious—cost related to American 
oil dependence is the risk it poses to economic stability.  Empirical 
research has established a relationship between oil price shocks and 
subsequent periods of economic decline.
227
  The oil shock of 2007–
2008, when the price per barrel reached new records, primarily re-
sulted from two factors: the low elasticity of demand for oil and the 
failure of oil production to increase along with demand.
228
  Price elas-
ticity of demand represents the relationship between the percentage 
change in demand that results from a percentage change in a prod-
uct’s price.
229
  Low price elasticity demonstrates that the demand for a 
product is less sensitive to the increase of the product’s price.
230
  In 
other words, consumption fails to decrease significantly in response 
to relatively small increases in the price of oil.
231
 
 
 220 LAZZARI, supra note 155, at 8.  
 221 Mann, supra note 219, at 599.  
 222 LAZZARI, supra note 155, at 8 n.9; see Mann, supra note 219, at 603–05. 
 223 See LAZZARI, supra note 155, at 8. 
 224 Id. 
 225 JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 115, at 131.  
 226 LAZZARI, supra note 155, at 8. 
 227 See James Hamilton, Causes and Consequences of the Oil Shock of 2007–08 (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15002, 2009). 
 228 Id. at 23. 
 229 See 1 PALGRAVE, supra note 145, at 126–27.   
 230 Id. 
 231 Some scholars have also suggested that short-term demand for gasoline today 
is less elastic than it was two to three decades ago.  See Jonathan Hughes et al., Evi-
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There is persuasive evidence that, had it not been for the recent 
oil price shock, the United States would not have entered a period of 
recession in 2007.
232
  The global demand for oil grew rapidly from 
2005 to 2007, while at the same time production stagnated.
233
  Al-
though energy prices increased as a result of growing demand, con-
sumers continued to buy gasoline at the same levels as before simply 
because they “could afford to do just that.”
234
  With the growing dis-
parity between supply and demand and the unwillingness of consum-
ers to reduce consumption accordingly, the prices needed to rise “by 
whatever it took to persuade [consumers] to do so.”
235
  Thus, gasoline 
needed to reach the record price of four dollars per gallon to finally 
affect consumption in a meaningful way.
236
  The shock led to signifi-
cant decline in the automobile industry, as well as declines in overall 
consumer spending and consumer sentiment.
237
 
The recent recession demonstrates the troubling vulnerability of 
the U.S. economy created by its dependence on oil.  Policy measures 
are urgently needed to address this challenge.
238
  Because a repeal of 
oil subsidies is not likely to decrease oil production or to increase the 
price of oil products, additional measures are necessary to address 
America’s overconsumption of oil. 
B. A Proposed Solution—Production Tax 
As this Comment demonstrated earlier, oil subsidies are unne-
cessary and contradict important policy goals.  While repeal is a ne-
cessary step in the creation of effective tax oil policy, it must achieve 
at least two important policy goals.  First, it needs to address the costs 
of oil dependence.  Second, it should foster United States’ competi-
tiveness in the global market for clean energy technologies.  The driv-
ing force of oil dependence is America’s appetite for oil.  As noted 
 
dence of a Shift in the Short-Run Price Elasticity of Gasoline Demand, 29 THE ENERGY J. 93 
(2006).   
 232 See Hamilton, supra note 227, at 32. 
 233 Oil and the Economy: The Impact of Rising Global Demand on the U.S. Recovery: Hear-
ing Before the J. Econ. Comm., 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of James Hamilton, Pro-
fessor, University of California San Diego). 
 234 Id. 
 235 Id. 
 236 See id.  By contrast, European economies seem to be less vulnerable to increas-
es in oil prices despite, or maybe because of, the fact that oil prices are much higher 
in Europe.  See Mark Landler, With Its Gas Prices Already High, Europe Is Less Rattled by 
Jump, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2004, at C1. 
 237 Hamilton, supra note 227, at 35. 
 238 Id. at 43. 
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earlier, scholars suggest that the only viable alternative to address oil 
security is through reduction of overall reliance on oil.
239
  The envi-
ronmental damages and the economic vulnerabilities that oil creates 
can also be alleviated by general reduction in demand. 
When certain industries impose external costs on society (in this 
case security, environmental, and economic costs), a common policy 
choice is to tax them to compensate for these costs.
240
  Taxes that 
serve to correct the market for such costs are called Pigovian taxes.
241
  
One of the most frequently mentioned Pigovian taxes today is a tax 
on carbon emissions.
242
  The objective of carbon tax is to reduce car-
bon emissions to fight global climate change.
243
  While reducing car-
bon emissions may correlate somewhat with a decrease in oil con-
sumption, reduction in the one variable does not necessarily lead to 
decrease in the other.  For example, recent legislative proposals 
aimed at curbing carbon emissions targeted electric utilities and 
would affect oil consumption relatively little.
244
  Effectively addressing 
oil externalities requires a more direct approach. 
Taxing oil production targets production directly by making in-
vestments in oil projects less attractive and affects consumption by 
making it more expensive.  Thus, this Comment proposes that an oil 
production tax could be a sensible way to address the problems that 
oil dependence creates.  One of the first questions that emerge is 
who should pay the tax.  It would be difficult and expensive to impose 
the tax on a broad tax base, such as oil consumers, because consump-
tion is spread among many individuals and entities.
245
  Therefore, it is 
sensible to impose the tax upstream, at the earliest point of produc-
 
 239 See sources cited supra note 219. 
 240 LAZZARI, supra note 155, at 8. 
 241 Gilbert E. Metcalf & David Weisbach, The Design of a Carbon Tax, 33 HARV. 
ENVTL. L. REV. 499, 500 (2009). 
 242 See generally Reuven S. Avi-Yunah & David M. Uhlmann, Combating Global Cli-
mate Change: Why a Carbon Tax Is Better Response to Global Warming than Cap and Trade 
System, 28 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3 (2009). 
 243 See id. at 50.  
 244 Anne C. Mulkern, Would a Push to Curb Carbon Really Reduce U.S. Dependence on 
Oil, N.Y. TIMES (June 22, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2010/06/22/ 
22greenwire-would-a-push-to-curb-carbon-really-reduce-us-d-19627.html.  This Com-
ment is not arguing against a carbon tax.  A carbon tax can achieve important envi-
ronmental policy goals and can be used in conjunction with other measures that ad-
dress the oil dependence problem in a more direct way.  
 245 See Metcalf & Weisbach, supra note 241, at 501 (“As the [carbon tax] base gets 
broader, collection costs increase . . . .”).  Although Professors Metcalf and Weisbach 
discuss the optimal tax design in terms of costs and basis of a carbon tax, the same 
concerns exist in the design of oil production tax.  
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tion.
246
  Such design is more efficient because there are fewer up-
stream producers, which results in lower collection and monitoring 
costs.
247
  In substance, taxing oil production could raise the marginal 
cost of production and consequently discourage investments in oil.
248
  
At the same time, such disincentives could have the opposite effect 
with respect to alternative energy sources and make them more at-
tractive investment choices.  The relative attractiveness of alternative 
energy sources as compared to oil could be further augmented by the 
myriad of renewable energy subsidies that the government currently 
provides.
249
 
Of course, it is also possible that oil companies pass at least part 
of the tax on to consumers.  Thus, the oil production tax could turn 
into a consumption tax because consumers will bear it.  As the con-
sumer prices of oil products rise, they could discourage consumption 
of oil products and encourage energy consumption from alternative 
sources.
250
  One common criticism with this respect to oil taxes is that 
they are regressive.
251
  Regressivity, however, is not an immutable cha-
racteristic.  The extent of regressivity largely depends on the way the 
tax revenues are returned back into the economy.
252
  One way of re-
ducing the regressive effect of an oil tax is to pair it with a reduction 
in another tax.
253
  Such a design achieves both the main objective of 
the tax and alleviates its economic burden on the taxpayers. 
 
 246 See id. at 523.  A commensurate tax on oil imports may be necessary in order to 
prevent consumers from switching to cheaper oil imports.  
 247 See id. 
 248 See Mitch Kunce & William E. Morgan, Taxation of Oil and Gas in the United 
States 1970–1997, 45 NAT. RESOURCES J. 77, 79, 81 (2005) (observing that oil and gas 
production taxes raise the marginal cost of production and reduce investment in the 
development of oil and gas). 
 249 One example of such an incentive is the credit for investment in manufactur-
ing facilities for clean energy.  See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 48C (2006).  The credit equals 
thirty percent of the investment in such a facility and is distributed on a competitive 
basis.  See § 48C(d). 
 250 Cf. Antonio Bento et al., Distributional and Efficiency Impacts of Gasoline Taxes: An 
Econometrically Based Multi-Market Study, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 282, 285–86 (2005) (link-
ing an increase in gasoline taxes to decline in gasoline consumption, mainly from 
decrease in vehicle-miles traveled). 
 251 See, e.g., LAZZARI, supra note 155. (noting that energy taxes tend to be regressive 
and could have dire macroeconimic effects). 
 252 Cf. Bento, supra note 250, at 283. 
 253 See, e.g., Robert Stavins, A Tale of Two Taxes, An Economic View on the Environment, 
BELFER CENTER (Mar. 19, 2009, 8:08 AM), 
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/analysis/stavins/?p=73 (proposing a gas tax in-
crease combined with a decrease in Social Security tax on wages). 
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While an oil production tax is at the core of a program to curb 
oil consumption, there are other factors that could affect its success.  
Meaningful reduction in oil consumption can only be achieved if 
there are viable transportation alternatives for consumers.  Federal 
policies have supported automobile-dependent transportation modes 
for decades.
254
  Intense highway construction, spurred by federal sup-
port, occurred at the same time that suburban living expanded as a 
result of local regulation favorable to single-family homes and hous-
ing subsidies for sparsely populated areas.
255
  New policies need to 
make alternative transportation modes accessible to consumers. For 
example, imposing congestion fees and tolls, providing policy incen-
tives for telecommuting, using intelligent traffic management sys-
tems, increasing the flexibility of land development rules, and provid-
ing financial help to low-income individuals for mass transit use could 
achieve this goal.
256
 
Another critical factor for the success of the proposed tax policy 
is the development of a robust, green energy industry, which can 
both secure abundance of oil alternatives and create new jobs to ab-
sorb any job losses from traditional energy sectors.
257
  In this regard, 
China’s growing competitiveness in renewable energy manufacturing 
is a cause for concern.  While the U.S. government has dedicated 
substantial resources for the development of the green economy, 
these resources are slow to trickle down to manufacturers.
258
  There 
are various bureaucratic reasons behind these delays, such as pay re-
quirements for contractors and understaffed administrative bodies.
259
  
Meanwhile, China is emerging as the world leader for green energy 
manufacturing.
260
  China is on its way of becoming the world’s largest 
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manufacturer of wind turbines and solar panels.
261
  Government poli-
cies give China a competitive edge.  The Chinese government trans-
fers free land and subsidizes loans for green energy initiatives on a 
regular basis.
262
  Despite criticism that such practices are in violation 
of international trade rules, many businesses are unwilling to protest 
due to fears that China will retaliate against foreign business ventures 
in the country.
263
  But China’s success teaches one thing—the United 
States’ green energy industry can flourish only with robust govern-
ment subsidies.  While the United States should adhere to its obliga-
tions under international trade agreements, the current Administra-
tion should devise innovative ways to support the green industry and 
ensure that the resources are distributed quickly and efficiently, 
without undue delay. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In the aftermath of the BP oil spill, important policy questions 
about the tax treatment of the oil industry have emerged.  These is-
sues have spurred debate and legislative actions.  Some of the ques-
tions were myopic.  For one, in spite of the criticism, BP’s oil-spill re-
lated deduction reflects long-accepted tax principles and was 
perfectly legitimate.  But, the oil spill also helped refocus the discus-
sion on a more fundamental problem.  Critics have aptly noted that 
the oil industry has enjoyed unprecedented favorable tax treatment 
for decades.  Today, these benefits are unjustified, wasteful, and con-
tradict important policies that are designed to steer the U.S. economy 
away from oil dependence into a clean energy future.  Repealing oil 
tax subsidies is an important step towards achieving these policy 
goals, but it may be insufficient.  Excessive oil consumption results in 
security, environmental, and economic costs that require separate ac-
tions.  The linchpin of a plan designed to address these problems is a 
tax on oil production.  Another important feature of such a plan is 
the implementation of policies that allow for auto-independent exis-
tence and adequate response to world competition in the clean ener-
gy industry.  Ultimately, Congress must create a comprehensive, long-
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term policy plan to address the challenges of oil consumption, in 
which taxes and tax incentives, together, should play a major role.   
 
